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Abstract 
 
Using a database of more than 180,000 private companies from 2000 to 2009, we find 
that the benefits of holding more cash vary substantially with a firm’s size and the 
conditions it faces.  Cash holdings matter most for small firms: When there are negative 
shocks to industry or macroeconomic conditions, a small firm’s cash holdings are 
positively associated with changes in its sales and assets.  Cash is less important for other 
conditions.  Differences in the benefits of cash holdings between large and small firms 
are traced to a firm’s ability – and willingness – to increase leverage when there is a cash 
shortfall. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the vast majority of firms in Europe, Japan, and the United States are small 
and privately owned, most empirical research of corporate financial policies examines 
large publicly traded corporations for which data are more widely available.1  What 
we do know about the financial policies of private firms is that they differ from public 
firms.  Private firms have choppier dividends, invest more, hold less cash, are more 
levered, and rarely borrow long term debt or sell equity when compared to similar 
public firms.2  Moreover, there are important differences in exposures to financing 
risks.  For example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that small businesses, which 
account for the vast majority of private firms, are more sensitive to an increase in 
interest rates than larger businesses.  Others have argued that private firms face 
greater sensitivities to venture capitalists’ ability to raise capital and to decreases in 
housing prices.   
In this paper, we provide evidence on the financial policies of private firms by 
studying the value of cash holdings.  We use a large database of private companies 
from 2000 to 2009 to examine questions regarding the types of private firms for 
which cash holdings are most valuable, when cash holdings are most valuable, and 
why cash holdings are more valuable for some firms than others.3  
The literature on the value of cash holdings has focused on public companies.  
This literature is somewhat divided.  There is compelling evidence in Harford (1999), 
                                                 
1 For example, the United States Census reports that among employers, 89 percent have less than 20 
employees.  Firms with less than 500 employees, which are almost exclusively privately held, account 
for roughly half of the employment in the United States.  (See 
http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html.)  Private companies are also a large part of the economy in 
other countries.  For example, Brav (2009) reports that two thirds of assets in the UK are owned by 
private firms. 
2 See Petersen and Rajan (1994), Brav (2009), Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2012), Gao, 
Harford, and Li (2012), Michaely and Roberts (2012), and others. 
3 The database contains over 238,000 firms.  More than 180,000 firms pass the data filters for our 
analysis. 
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Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), Nikolov and 
Whited (2010) and other studies indicating that high cash holdings can reflect – or 
even lead to – agency problems and destroy shareholder value.  There are also, 
however, well developed arguments for cash holdings increasing shareholder value.  
Most notably, a line of literature including Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(1999), Almedia, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) and 
others emphasize the precautionary benefits of cash and show that firms more likely 
to face financial constraints hoard relatively more cash.  A general theme of these 
arguments is that high cash holdings can provide a valuable hedge against downturns 
in internal cash flow.  Cash holdings can reduce a firm’s dependence on external 
financing during downturns and increase its ability to take on value increasing 
projects.  Empirically, the value of cash holdings for public firms appears to be 
greatest for constrained firms and around negative shocks to operating or financial 
conditions.4   
There are several reasons why cash holdings can be particularly valuable for 
private firms.  First, as discussed by Gao, Harford, and Li (2012) and Asker, Farre-
Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2012), because private firms are closely held, agency 
conflicts between owners and managers are of less concern than for public firms.  
Second, given the size and other characteristics of private firms, they often have fewer 
                                                 
4The value of cash holdings for publicly listed firms in the U.S. is studied by Harford, Mikkelson, and 
Partch (2003), Faulkender and Wang (2006), Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007), Denis and 
Sibilkov (2010), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010), and Fresard (2010).  Harford, Mikkelson, and 
Partch (2003) and Duchin, Ozbas and Sensoy (2010) examine performance around shocks.  Harford et 
al (2003) study industry downturns.  Duchin, et al (2010) study performance around the subprime 
financial crisis.  These papers show that a firm’s performance and investment around these events is 
positively associated with its cash holdings.  Faulkender and Wang (2006) find a greater value is placed 
on cash holdings if a firm is financially constrained. Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) show that 
cash holdings are greater for firms facing difficulties financing investment opportunities.  Denis and 
Sibilkov (2010) find that cash holdings enable constrained firms to fund value increasing investments.  
Fresard (2010) finds firms that hold more cash than rivals realize greater subsequent increases in 
market share, especially in competitive market and around shocks to competition.   
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sources of financing and can face greater difficulties raising capital externally than 
public firms.  Finally, because private firms often lack the expertise or other resources 
needed to use financial derivatives, cash holdings can be one of the few ways they can 
manage risks.  Our goal is to provide evidence on the extent to which cash holdings 
matter for private firms and whether the value of cash holdings varies across firms 
and conditions.   
Our sample is from a database of all limited liability firms incorporated in 
Norway and includes a firm’s annual balance sheet and income statement.  This 
database also includes information on a company’s ownership and compensation 
structure as well as the relationships between its owners, officers, and directors.  In 
general, the companies in the database are very small when compared to public 
companies in Europe, Japan and the United States: the median firm in the second 
largest quartile of the sample has eight employees and assets of 3.90 mm NOK 
(<$560 thousand).5  These firms are, however, very similar in size to the majority of 
active corporations in the United States.  For example, according to the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income Data, approximately 80% of active 
corporations in the United States in 2009 had less than $500 thousand in assets.6  
Although the sample is predominately small firms, much larger firms are also 
included.  The median firm among the 200 largest has 8370 mm NOK in assets (>$1 
billion).  Therefore, based on a firm’s size as a proxy for the costs of external 
financing (see e.g., Hennessy and Whited (2007)), the sample features both 
substantial costs of external financing and substantial variation in these costs.   
We start our analysis by studying the association between a firm’s cash 
holdings and changes in its operations.  We examine both the years when industry or 
                                                 
5An exchange rate of 7 NOK per USD is used here.  During the sample period the NOK ranges from 
roughly 5 to 9 NOK per USD.  Source: www.norges-bank.no. 
6 See: http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Table-2-Returns-of-Active-Corporations. 
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macroeconomic conditions change substantially, which we label as shocks, as well as 
non-shock years.  We document several findings.  First, when there are negative 
shocks to industries, small firms with more cash do better.  In particular, changes in a 
small firm’s sales, investment, and assets as well as the probability of it surviving a 
negative industry shock are positively associated with its cash holdings when the 
shock occurs.  Results are similar when we focus on a negative macroeconomic shock 
(the Global Financial Crisis), rather than industry specific shocks.  Second, cash 
holdings matter less during non-negative shock years.  Specifically, we find no 
association between a small firm’s cash holdings and changes in sales when we focus 
on years in which positive shocks occur or years without shocks.  Third, the benefits 
of holdings more cash are generally less for large firms than for small firms.  For 
example, we find no evidence that cash holdings are associated with changes in a 
large firm’s sales around a shock or with the probability of a large firm surviving a 
shock, regardless of the type of shock.  For large firms, cash matters most for changes 
in investment and assets around a negative macroeconomic shock.   
A concern in interpreting these findings is the potential endogeneity of a 
firm’s performance and its cash holdings.  In particular, although the association 
between a firm’s cash holdings, size, and changes in operations around negative 
shocks is consistent with cash being valuable for small firms, it could be explained by 
a firm’s quality.  For example, better performing firms or firms with better investment 
prospects might also hold more cash.  Although we cannot rule out this explanation, it 
is difficult to reconcile this firm quality explanation with the results for large firms or 
around other conditions.  If the association between a firm’s performance and its cash 
holdings can be explained by an omitted variable, the effect of this variable is such 
that it is only be important for small firms and only during negative shocks.  
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Moreover, the findings are similar when we use a firm’s average cash holdings for 
three years leading up to the shock rather than just the cash holdings in the year prior 
to the shock.  Therefore, it does not appear as if the results can be explained by 
variation in firms’ ability to anticipate negative shocks. 
Next, to understand why cash holdings matter, we examine financing choices 
around negative shocks.  The analysis reveals patterns in financing that help explain 
the value of cash holdings.  Foremost, there are differences between small firms and 
large firms in the use of additional credit around negative shocks.  Small firms reduce 
liabilities when there are negative shocks, regardless of cash holdings or whether the 
shock is on the industry or macroeconomic level.  Although this reduction might 
reflect a reduction in the firm’s ability to take on more debt, it might also reflect a 
reduction in the willingness to use more debt by owners who are likely poorly 
diversified.  There is no evidence that small firms make up for this decrease in 
liabilities and cash flow with an increase in equity financing.  As a result, the 
availability of internal financing is especially valuable for small firms around negative 
shocks.  In contrast, large firms increase the use of leverage during industry shocks.  
This increase is greatest for large firms with low cash holdings.  Although borrowing 
by large firms decreases during the Global Financial Crisis when credit standards 
tightened, there is no evidence that this decrease resulted in a greater reduction in 
sales by the large firms with less cash.   
In addition, for both large and small firms, the use of trade credit around 
negative shocks varies with cash holdings.  In particular, when negative shocks occur, 
trade credit on net (change in accounts payable minus change in accounts receivable) 
increases for low cash firms and decreases for high cash firms.  In other words, firms 
with less cash going into a negative shock increase their reliance on supplier financing 
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while the firms with greater cash holdings cut back their use of – or even became 
providers of – supplier financing.  This result is similar to the evidence in Garcia-
Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2012) for public firms around the Global Financial 
Crisis.  Given the high costs of supplier financing discussed in Petersen and Rajan 
(1994), the results show that an additional benefit of additional cash holdings for 
private firms, both large and small, is its effect on the use of supplier financing around 
negative shocks.   
Collectively, the results show that the value of cash holdings for private 
businesses varies substantially across firms and conditions.  There is little evidence 
that firms benefit from holding more cash during normal or abnormally good 
operating conditions.  The value of cash, however, is greatest when operating 
conditions turn negative, especially for small firms.  The differences in the value of 
cash between large and small firms can at least in part be traced to financing activities 
around negative shocks.   
Perhaps what is most surprising about these results is the importance of a 
firm’s size.  Given that the vast majority of the firms in the sample are very small 
(e.g., the median firm in the largest quartile has approximately $2 million in assets), 
we might expect nearly all of the firms in the sample to be constrained.  We find, 
however, that both financing around negative industry shocks and the importance of 
cash around negative industry shocks differ with a firm’s size. A possible explanation 
for a size effect within the sample is that there are few large firms in Norway, private 
or public.  A bank or other type of investor looking to provide capital to a Norwegian 
firm (because of a home bias, regulatory consideration, or other factors) has very 
limited choices if only considering firms generally classified as large. Therefore the 
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investor might need to consider much smaller firms than if investing in the U.S. or 
other larger countries.7  
Our paper relates to the literature on the financial policies of small and private 
businesses.  Similar to Petersen and Rajan (1994), Petersen and Rajan (1997), and 
Brav (2009), we explore forms of financing for small businesses.  These papers show 
that private firms depend primarily on debt financing and that banking relationships 
and financing from suppliers are especially important for small private businesses.  
Our findings indicate that when access to these forms of external financing is most 
limited, cash holdings are also a valuable form of financing. Therefore, similar to 
Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2013), our paper shows an interdependence between 
the risks of obtaining external financing and cash holdings.  Moreover, like Vickery 
(2008) our findings provide insights into risk management by small businesses.  
Vickery shows that small firms adjust their interest rate exposure to manage the risk 
of changes in the availability of credit.  Our study shows the importance of cash 
policy decisions for small firms in managing this and other types of risks. 
 
DATA 
We investigate the cash holdings of private firms using data from the Centre for 
Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at BI Norwegian Business School.8  To our 
knowledge, the database has the most extensive collection of financial information on 
private firms that exists.  It includes more than 238,000 firms incorporated in Norway.  
                                                 
7 This argument assumes that when compared to the U.S., there are few large Norwegian firms needing 
capital relative to the amount of available capital.  
8Accounting, ownership, and board data are delivered by Experian (www.experian.no) and are in 
principle publicly available.  Data on family relationships are from Skattedirektoratet (Norwegian Tax 
Administration).  All data items have been received in electronic form and are organized as an 
integrated database by the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (www.bi.edu/ccgr).  
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It has fifteen years of accounting data, nine years of governance data, credit ratings 
for each firm, and extensive data on ownership.  
The availability of these data arises because the Norwegian Accounting Act 
mandates that all limited liability firms be audited.9  Every limited liability firm, 
regardless of listing status, is required to publish an annual report with an income 
statement, a balance sheet, accompanying notes, board of directors’ report, and an 
auditor’s report.  The rules governing the structure and contents, which must be 
audited by a publicly certified auditor, apply to all limited liability firms.  Each firm 
must publish the identity of its CEO, directors, and owners, as well as the fraction of 
equity held by each owner.  If a firm fails to submit this information within seventeen 
months after a fiscal year end, automatic liquidation is triggered.  In addition to these 
data, CCGR also indentifies family relationships by blood and marriage for all 
owners, officers, and directors. 
We construct our dataset starting from the universe of all firms in Norway 
(145,656 firms in 2000; 238,213 firms in 2009).10  Using this dataset, we employ the 
following data selection criteria: we drop financial firms, public firms, non-limited 
liability firms, firms in which the largest owner is the Norwegian state, firms with 
missing industry codes, firms in which assets differ from liabilities plus shareholders 
equity by more than 2000 NOK, and firms in which financing related variables are in 
the tails of the variable distribution (bottom and top one percent).  Finally, we also 
discard firms if the number of employees is less than three or if it has no sales. The 
remaining sample consists of 50,696 firms in 2000 up to 66,817 firms in 2009.  A 
                                                 
9 For a further discussion of auditing of financial statements in Norway see Hope and Langli (2010).  
10 Some of our variables represent averages over several years and thus contain data prior to 2000.  We 
deflate all data to 1998 Norwegian Kroner (NOK).  Results, however, are virtually identical if we do 
not deflate the data. 
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detailed breakdown of the construction of the sample and the variables used in the 
analysis is shown in Appendix 1.  
 
Summary Statistics 
In Table 1 we sort the sample firms into quartiles by assets and report 
summary statistics.  Average sales are 1.7 mm NOK (<$250 thousand) for the 
smallest quartile and 31 mm NOK (>$4.4 million) for the largest quartile.  The 
average number of employees ranges from 5.3 for the smallest quartile to 24.9 for the 
largest.  Average assets are 0.54 mm NOK (<$100 thousand) for the smallest quartile 
to 24.6 mm NOK (>$3.5 million) for the largest quartile.  Therefore, these firms are 
generally very small when compared to publicly traded firms in the United States and 
even when compared to the private companies examined in some other studies: the 
median private firm in Gao, Harford, and Li (2012) has $228 million in assets and the 
average private firm in the sample in Michaely and Roberts (2012) has £86 million in 
assets.11  These firms are, however, very similar to the small businesses in the United 
States.  For example, more than 97 percent of the small businesses in the United 
States have less than 20 employees.12    
Firms tend to be profitable and have positive sales growth.  There is, however, 
substantial variation in the rate of growth and profitability within quartiles.  For 
example, among the smallest quartile of firms, year to year sales growth is 23% on 
average but close to 0% for the median firm.  Similarly, for the largest quartile of 
firms, year to year asset growth is 19% on average but only 4% for the median firm. 
                                                 
11 Closer in size to our sample are the privately held U.S. firms in Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist 
(2012).  The median private firm for the full sample of Akser et al. has $1.4 million in assets. 
12 See data in Table 1 of the SBA Office of Advocacy’s Small Business Profile report: 
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/us12.pdf .  The SBA generally defines small businesses as 
companies with less than 500 employees. 
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Although both the mean and the median of return on assets is generally positive 
across quartiles, in untabulated analysis we find that the fraction of firms not 
generating positive income ranges from 44% for the smallest quartile to 23% for the 
largest quartile. 
A noticeable difference across the quartiles is investment.  The largest quartile 
of firms invests an average of 1.05 mm NOK and a median of 0.158 mm NOK.  By 
comparison the second quartile only invests 0.05 mm NOK and the smallest quartile 
invests an average of 0.005 mm NOK.  In additional untabulated analysis, we find 
that investment as a fraction of assets is an average of 4% for the largest two quartiles 
and 3% for the second quartile and close to 0% for the smallest quartile.  Therefore, 
the greatest difference in investment is for the smallest quartile of firms. 
Consistent with more constrained firms hoarding cash, cash holdings are 
greatest for the smallest firms.  The ratio of cash to assets ranges from an average of 
0.33 and a median of 0.26 for the smallest quartile to an average of 0.18 and a median 
of 0.10 for the largest quartile.  This pattern in cash holdings is similar to that in Gao, 
Harford, and Li (2012) who find that among private firms in the United States, cash 
holdings are negatively associated with assets.  It is also similar to the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Statistics of Income Data, the ratio of cash to assets is 24% for 
firms with less than $500 thousand in assets and 6% for firms with more than $25 
million in assets.   In addition to the variation across quartiles of the sample, there is 
also substantial variation of cash holdings within the quartiles.  The standard 
deviation of cash holdings is 28% for the smallest quartile and 20% for the largest 
quartile of firms.  
The ratio of liabilities to assets is similar across quartiles.  Medians for the 
quartiles fall between 78% and 83% and averages are between 73% and 87%.  
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Substantial differences, however, exist in the composition of the liabilities.  
Consistent with the idea that small firms face difficulties raising long term debt, the 
ratio of short term liabilities to total liabilities for the smallest quartile is an average of 
0.83 and the median is 1.  For firms in the largest quartile, the average ratio of short 
term liabilities to long term liabilities is 0.65 and the median is 0.73.  The high 
leverage ratio and dependence on short term liabilities among these firms in general is 
consistent with Brav (2009) who argues that these choices reflect private equity being 
more costly than public equity and the desire of owners to maintain control.   
Although the majority of firms do not pay dividends, firms that do pay 
dividends pay out a large fraction of income.  The median dividend payout (dividends 
to net income) is 0%.  The average dividend payout, however, is 14% for the smallest 
quartile of firms and between 26% and 30% for the other quartiles.   
Finally, most firms are closely held.  The largest shareholder owns between 
62% and 68% of the firm’s shares on average.  The fraction of the shares owned by 
the CEO declines from 53% for the smallest quartile to 25% for the largest quartile. 
The medians decline from 50% to 0%.  Institutional ownership is almost non-existent. 
Institutions own an average of 0.34% of the smallest quartile firms and 1.89% of the 
largest. State ownership is of a similar magnitude.13 
The characteristics indicate that although all the firms are private, there are 
likely important differences in their access to external financing.  The financing 
policy choices, particularly cash holdings and use of long term liabilities, are 
consistent with the view of Hennessy and Whited (2007) and others that smaller firms 
face greater difficulties in obtaining external financing than larger firms.   
                                                 
13 As noted above, firms in which the largest owner is the State are excluded from the sample.  
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To examine when – or if – cash holdings are of value, we focus on how a firm 
performs during years when there are large changes (what we label as “shocks”) to its 
operating environment that can have important effects on its cash flows.  We examine 
whether a firm’s performance around these shocks, as well as during non-shock years, 
varies with its size and cash holdings.   
 
ANALYSIS OF FIRM PERFORMANCE AROUND SHOCKS 
Industry shocks 
 Our primary definition of a shock to a firm’s operating environment is based 
on changes in sales for a firm’s industry.  Using data from 2000 to 2008, we sort all 
firms into one of eight industries (using NAICS codes).14  These industries include 
agriculture, manufacturing, energy, construction, service, trade, transport, and firms 
operating in multiple sectors.  We then identify the industry-years with the largest 
change in sales at the aggregate level.  We classify the industry-years with a year to 
year change in sales that is in the bottom decile of all industry years as negative 
shocks and industry years in the top decile as positive shocks.15   
Summary statistics for the industry years with positive and negative shocks are 
shown in Table 2.  The industry-years with negative shocks include three different 
industries from seven different years.  The decline in sales in the negative shock 
group is at least -7.22%.  The industry years with positive shocks include five 
different industries and five different years.  The increase in sales for the positive 
shock group is 25% or more.  Several of the industries that realized a positive shock 
                                                 
14 Data from 2009 are used in the analysis of macroeconomic shocks. 
15 We have 72  industry-years.  Therefore, we are not able to cut the sample into exactly the top and 
bottom decile.  The cutoffs we use are the top and bottom 11% of the sample, i.e., eight industry years. 
The cutoff at eight industry-years (versus seven) is also at the point in which there are clearer 
differences in industry performance.  For example, in the seventh and eighth worst industry-years, the 
decline in sales from the prior year is -7.65% and -7.22%. In the ninth worst industry-year, which we 
do not count as a negative shock, the decline in sales is only -4.35%. 
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have substantially more firms than industries that realize a decrease; therefore the 
number of firms we examine around positive shocks is greater than the firms around 
negative shocks.16 
 To examine the importance of these shocks at the firm level rather than at the 
industry level we estimate regressions using a framework similar to Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994).  Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) examine the differences in performance 
between large and small manufacturing firms around changes in monetary policy 
rather than in industry conditions.  The regressions we estimate are panel regressions 
using the entire sample from 2000 to 2008.  The dependent variables include changes 
in sales, inventory, and short term liabilities.  A dummy variable that is set to one in 
any year in which a firm’s industry realized a shock and zero otherwise is included as 
an explanatory variable in the regressions.  Like Gertler and Gilchrist, we estimate 
regressions for small and large firms separately.  For brevity in presenting the results, 
we classify firms in the two smallest quartiles as small firms and the firms in the two 
largest quartiles as large firms.  Results are similar if we break the firms in quartiles.   
The results from these regressions are shown in Table 3.  The dependent 
variable used in each regression is shown in the first column and the coefficient on the 
dummy variable indicating a shock is shown in the next two columns.  The 
regressions indicate that the events we identify as shocks do not simply reflect 
changes for just a handful of the most dominant firms in the industry and are not just 
artifacts of the data (i.e., a result of firms leaving the sample or new firms entering the 
sample).  In particular, both large and small firms realize a significant change in sales 
                                                 
16 There are also year to year differences in the number of firms in the industries.  We can determine 
entry and exit of firms operating in an industry. However, we cannot determine the reason for other 
differences: they might reflect changes in the collection methodology by the data provider, or some 
other aspect of the data.  Because these differences are particularly notable for the multi-sector 
industry, we re-estimate the analysis without this industry. The findings from the analysis that excludes 
multi-sector are qualitatively similar to those presented here. 
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around these shocks.  For example, when we use the change in the ratio of sales to 
assets as a dependent variable, the coefficient for the year of the negative industry 
shock is -0.11 for small firms and -0.08 for large firms.  For the dummy variable 
indicating a positive industry shock, the coefficient is 0.17 for small firms and 0.12 
for large firms.  All of these coefficients are statistically significant showing that these 
are events that ripple throughout the firms in the industry.   
The regressions also provide a comparison to the findings of Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994).  Gertler and Gilchrist examine changes in sales, inventory, and debt 
around changes in monetary policy.  They find that, in general, small firms lose 
ground to large firms when the availability of credit tightens and do not make up this 
ground when credit loosens.  Gertler and Gilchrist interpret the findings as evidence 
of small firms facing liquidity constraints.  Similar to Gertler and Gilchrist, we find a 
significant reduction in inventory around negative shocks for small firms but not for 
large firms and no significant increases in inventory for small firms around positive 
shocks.17  These findings are generally consistent with the idea that the effect of 
shocks can vary with a firm’s size.  Our interest turns to the importance of cash 
holdings in managing the effects of these shocks. 
 
Cash holdings, firm performance, and industry shocks 
In Table 4 we estimate ordinary least square regressions for the industry-years 
with negative shocks and the industry-years with positive shocks.  The dependent 
variable in these regressions is the change in sales scaled by assets.  By construction, 
                                                 
17 Analysis of changes in sales and short term debt provides a less direct comparison to Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994) for a couple of reasons.  First, the change in sales around shocks in our sample largely 
reflects the way a shock is defined.  Second, because the use of short term debt is increasing during the 
sample period, a negative coefficient on the change in short term debt during shock years can reflect a 
decrease in short term debt or an increase in short term debt just at a slower rate than non-shock years.  
In analysis we discuss below, we separately examine the cross sectional variation in the change in sales 
and short term debt around these shocks.  
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all firms in our sample have sales.  Only about 70%, however, have positive profits.  
As explanatory variables we include variables to control for cash holdings and wide 
range of other firm level operating characteristics that are described in the table.  In 
addition to these control variables, we include industry and year dummy variables and 
cluster errors at the firm level.   
Of primary interest for our analysis is the coefficient on cash holdings from 
these regressions.  The regressions in Table 4a are estimated using the entire sample 
of firms around positive and negative shocks.  The coefficients on cash holdings in 
these regressions are statistically insignificant.  These findings indicate that, in 
general, more cash does not lead to better performance during shocks. 
Next, based on arguments that a firm’s access to the capital markets can vary 
with its size, we further sort the sample into small and large firms.  The results from 
these regressions are shown in Table 4b.18  
The regressions in Table 4b show differences in the importance of cash 
holdings between small and large firms and between positive and negative shocks.  
Among small firms, the level of cash holdings is positively associated with the change 
in sales around negative shocks.  Based on the coefficient on this variable of 0.33, a 
one standard deviation increase in cash holdings is associated with an increase in sales 
for small firms around negative shocks of 6.3%.  This increase is roughly two times 
the change in sales for the average small firm around negative shocks.  This finding 
indicates that the small firms that had greater cash holdings going into a negative 
shock did better than small firms with less cash.  The coefficients on cash holdings in 
                                                 
18 In addition to the analysis shown here, we consider various robustness checks.  For example, in 
untabulated analysis, we repeat these regressions but sort the firms into quartiles instead of into small 
and large.  The results from these regression specifications are consistent with the analysis shown here.  
Further, our results are essentially unchanged when we sort by all firms that pass our filters instead of 
sorting by only firms that realize shocks.  
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the other regressions are not significant.  The findings show that the benefits to small 
firms from additional cash holdings, at least in terms of changes in sales, are only 
apparent around negative shocks.  For large firms, the benefits from additional cash 
holdings are less clear.  The coefficient on cash holdings is not significant during 
positive or negative shocks.   
The findings do not appear to simply reflect faster growing firms holding more 
cash.  For example, the regressions include average sales growth for past years as a 
control variable.19  Moreover, in the last two columns of Table 4b, we estimate 
additional regressions on the change in sales for years when shocks do not occur.  The 
idea for these regressions is that if a firm’s cash holding is just a proxy for its sales 
growth in general, there should be a positive correlation between cash holdings and 
sales growth in non-shock years as well.  There is no evidence in these last two 
columns that cash holdings are associated with sales growth when no shock occurs.  
The regressions include both industry and time fixed effects, so it also does not appear 
that these findings reflect unobserved characteristics of industries or time.  
Findings are similar when we follow an approach similar to Duchin et al 
(2009) and use the average of the past three years of cash holdings rather than just the 
year prior to the shock.  These results, shown in Table 4c, indicate that the association 
between cash holdings and change in sales around negative shocks does not appear to 
be explained by differences in firms’ ability to anticipate a shock. A difference in 
these results from the earlier findings is that when all observations are pooled, average 
cash holdings are positive regardless of the firm size.  These findings, shown in the 
                                                 
19 The results shown for regressions on changes in sales (Table 4a, 4b, 5, and 9) also include the sales 
growth for the past year t-1.  Results are similar if we exclude the sales growth for year t-1 from these 
specifications.  In addition, a lagged measure for high hedging needs (HHN) is included in these 
regressions to control for sales growth fuelled by recently executed growth options that required large 
cash positions.  Results for the association between cash holdings and firm performance in negative 
shock industry-years are similar if regressions are estimated with contemporaneous HHN rather than 
lagged HHN. 
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last two columns of table 4c, indicate that although prior year cash holdings are 
generally not associated with the change in sales, firms with higher cash holdings on 
average realize a greater increase in sales.   
In Table 4d, we take a slightly different approach by pooling the sample and 
estimating an ordinary least squares regression.  Like the earlier regressions, the 
dependent variable is the change in sales to assets.  Included in this regression are the 
dummy variables Negative Shock, Small Firm, and High Cash, along with the control 
variables from the earlier regressions.  Negative Shock equals one in years in which 
the firm’s industry realized a negative shock and zero otherwise.  Small Firms equals 
one if the firm’s assets are less than the median and zero otherwise.  High Cash 
Holdings is set to one if the firm’s ratio of cash to assets is in the top quartile and zero 
otherwise.  These dummy variables are also interacted.   
Of primary interest in this difference-in-difference-in-difference specification 
is the triple interaction term of Negative Shock, Small Firm, and High Cash.  The 
coefficient on this term in Table 4d is 0.152 and is statistically significant.  This result 
indicates that the change in sales to assets around negative shocks for small firms net 
the change for large firms is greater for the small firms with the greatest amount of 
cash.  These findings are consistent with the results in Table 4b and support the idea 
that the benefits of cash are greatest for small firms around negative shocks.   
One explanation for the positive association between cash holdings and 
performance for small firms around negative shocks is that cash holdings provide a 
hedge against downturns in cash flow.  An alternative is that there is an endogenous 
association between cash holdings and performance.  Companies with better 
investment opportunities might choose to hold more cash or there might be some 
other variable omitted from the analysis that explains the findings.  Although there 
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does not seem to be a way -- at least we are not aware of a way -- to fully address 
concerns of endogeneity in this setting, the results help mitigate these concerns.  In 
particular, there is no association between cash holdings and performance for small 
firms when there is no shock or when there is a positive shock. There is also no 
evidence of an association between cash holdings and performance for large firms 
around any condition.  If the association between cash holdings and performance is 
endogenous, it is not clear why this association is apparent when small firms realize 
negative shocks but not for larger firms or around other shocks.  
Overall, the findings in Table 4b, 4c, and 4d are consistent with benefits to 
small firms from additional cash holdings.  The findings, however, also show that 
more cash is not always better.  In particular, small firms benefit from holding more 
cash only when there is a negative shock.  Large firms do not appear to benefit from 
holding more cash around industry shocks, at least in terms of changes of sales.  The 
results indicate that although holding cash can be a valuable hedge, who benefits and 
when they do so can be limited.   
 
Macroeconomic shocks 
To further investigate the importance of cash holdings we focus on company 
performance around the Global Financial Crisis.  Although this crisis became 
widespread in 2008, much of the effect on the industries in Norway was felt in 2009.  
For example, the median industry in 2009 realized a decrease in sales of 12.02%.  By 
comparison, in the second worst year in Norway during our sample period (1999), the 
decrease in sales for the median industry was 1.41%.  Also around this time, the 
availability of credit across the economy tightened substantially.  For example, the 
Norges Bank’s Survey of Bank Lending indicates a trend of tightening credit 
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standards from 2007 until the third quarter of 2009.20  Therefore, this event was not 
only a large shock to firm’s internal cash flows, but also occurred when access to 
external financing was especially limited.  
We conduct our analysis using the firms that existed at the end of 2009 and 
sort the sample firms by size.21  We then estimate regressions on the change in sales 
in 2009 using the control variables from Table 4.  These regressions are shown in 
Table 5a.  The regressions in Table 5b are identical except the average of cash 
holdings for the three years leading up to shock is included in the regression rather 
than just cash holding prior to the shock. 
The results in Table 5a and Table 5b are similar to those in Tables 4b, 4c, and 
4d.  During 2009, the coefficient on the cash holdings variable is significantly positive 
for small firms but not for large.  This finding shows that, among the small 
companies, the ones with more cash did better through the Global Financial Crisis.  In 
Table 5a, the coefficient on this variable is 0.20.  To put this value into perspective, a 
one standard deviation increase in cash holdings is associated with a change in sales 
around a negative macroeconomic shock that is 4.5 percentage points better than the 
change in sales for the average small firm.  For larger firms, performance around this 
crisis does not vary with cash holdings.  The results indicate that there are benefits of 
cash holdings for small firms around downturns at the macroeconomic level as well as 
at the industry level.  The benefits of additional cash holdings for larger firms around 
these events are less clear. 
 
Changes in operations around shocks  
                                                 
20  See http://www.norges-bank.no/en/about/published/publications/norges-banks-survey-of-bank-
lending/.  For further discussion about the effects of the global financial crisis on Norway also see: 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1014.htm.  
21 Later in the analysis, we examine the survivorship of firms through a shock. 
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 Although the data limit our ability to pinpoint the ways that cash is used to 
help sales (e.g., we do not observe changes in advertising expenditures or 
maintenance), we can observe other changes in firms’ operating activities.  To study 
the importance of cash for other activities, we examine changes in inventory, 
employees, investment, dividends, and assets. 
We start by sorting the sample by size and examine changes around shocks for 
small and large firms.  The findings indicate that around negative industry shocks 
small firms generally make larger cuts to operations than large firms.  For example, as 
shown in the first two columns of Panel A in Table 6, the median small firm reduces 
its inventory by 2.4%, its assets by 3.9%, and its investments by 79.5%.  By 
comparison, the median large firm increases assets by 1.3%, increases inventory by 
3.6%, and decreases its investments by 67%.  Results are similar in Panel B, when we 
examine the macroeconomic shock.  Again we find a larger decrease in inventory, 
assets, and investment for small firms than large.   
Next, to examine the importance of cash holdings for these changes, we 
further sort the sample by cash holdings.  Columns 4 to 9 of Table 6, indicate that 
cash holdings are important in several ways.  For example, around the negative 
industry shocks shown in Panel A, the greatest reduction in investment and in assets is 
for the firms with the least amount of cash.  Low cash small firms reduce investment 
by 83% and reduce assets by 5% while small firms with high cash reduce investment 
by 75% and assets by 2.5%.  For large firms, the primary difference is that the 
reduction in investment by low cash firms of 73% is significantly greater than the 
reduction in investment by high cash firms of 57%.  
The importance of cash holdings becomes more apparent in Panel B when we 
examine changes around the Global Financial Crisis.  For small firms, the reduction in 
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inventory and assets is greater for firms with low cash holdings.  Although there are 
large cuts in investment regardless of cash holdings, the cuts are slightly greater for 
firms with high cash.  For large firms, there are clear differences in the changes in 
operations between high cash and low cash firms.  Inventory, investment, and assets 
are all reduced by a greater extent by the large firms with low cash holdings.  
Therefore, although we do not find that cash holdings are associated with changes in 
the sales for large firms, there is some evidence that cash holdings can be important 
for other aspects of a large firm’s operations.  
A comparison of Panel A to Panel B shows that the benefits of cash vary with 
the type of shock.  A potential reason for this variation is that the effect of a shock on 
capital market conditions can depend on the shock.  For example, industry specific 
shocks likely have little effect on bank lending or the availability of other forms 
external financing.  Therefore, a company facing a decrease in internal financing 
because of an industry shock can increase its use of external financing and lose little 
ground to counterparts with more cash.  Macroeconomic shocks, however, can have a 
much larger effect on the availability of external financing.  (See for example, the 
Norges Bank’s Survey discussed earlier.)  When negative macroeconomic shocks 
occur, offsetting a decrease in internal financing with external financing becomes 
more difficult and firms with low cash holdings are at a greater disadvantage.  The 
findings indicate that the benefits large firms realize from cash holdings can vary with 
the conditions of the lending market.   
 
ANALYSIS OF CASH HOLDINGS AND FINANCING 
The findings show that the benefits of cash holdings vary with a firm’s size 
and the operating conditions it faces.  To further understand these results we examine 
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questions that focus on the financing decisions leading up to and at the time of the 
shock. 
 
Why are there differences in cash holdings? 
The variation in the benefits from cash holdings raises questions regarding the 
reasons for the variation in cash holdings.  To better understand why some firms hold 
more cash than others, we analyze the cross sectional variation in cash holdings.  Of 
interest is the extent to which the differences in cash holdings reflect differences in 
historical operating performance and prior external financing activities.   
To examine a firm’s sources of cash we follow an approach similar to Kim 
and Weisbach (2008), Hertzel and Li (2010), and McLean (2011) and regress the 
firm’s cash holdings at the beginning of the shock year (t-1) on potential sources of 
the cash.  The explanatory variables in the analysis include the firm’s operating cash 
flow, dividend payout, debt issues, equity issues, and historical cash holdings.  We 
sort the sample into large and small firms and also by high and low cash.  The 
findings are shown in Table 7.  Regressions in Panel A are estimated using the past 
four years of data.  The regressions in Panel B use the average value of these variables 
for the past four years.    
The sources of cash are similar between large and small firms.  Internal 
financing is an important determinant of cash holdings for both groups.  In particular, 
the variation in cash is associated with the current year’s operating cash flow.  For 
large firms, the operating cash flow in prior years (i.e., year t-2 and year t-3) are also 
statistically significant, although not for small firms.  When we examine the variation 
in cash holdings using the average values from prior years, operating cash flow is 
only statistically significant for larger firms.  Stronger results are found for the firm’s 
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choice of a payout policy, measured using (OPCF-DIV)/OPCF.  Firms that, on 
average, retained a larger fraction of their operating cash have more cash at the time 
of the shock.  This is true for both small and large firms.  Moreover, unlike operating 
cash flow, the variables for payout policy in prior years are significant for small firms.  
Therefore, the variation in cash holdings is not just a function of which firms 
generated cash but also the extent to which they retained the cash.  
There is little evidence that the variation in cash holdings arises from 
differences in external financing.  For both small and large firms, there is no 
consistent association between changes in liabilities or equity and cash holdings.  For 
the few cases in which change in liabilities is significant, the coefficient is negative 
indicating that firms with more borrowing did not result in greater cash holdings. 
The strongest results are for historical cash holdings.  For both large and small 
firms, cash holdings at the time of the shock (t-1) are positively associated with cash 
holdings three years prior to the shock (t-4).  This persistence in cash holdings is 
similar to that documented for public firms in Dittmar and Duchin (2010) and for 
private firms in Gao, Harford, and Li (2012) and consistent with a firm choosing a 
cash holdings policy rather than cash building up randomly.  
The results indicate that cash holdings largely reflect corporate cash 
management policies.  Firms with greater cash holdings have retained a larger fraction 
of the cash from operations and have historically kept high levels of cash.  These 
findings hold for large and small firms.  The results are consistent with cash being 
held for precautionary reasons, rather than just being a residual effect of greater 
profitability.  
 
How do firms finance themselves when shocks occur?  
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We next examine the variation in firms’ use of external financing around 
negative shocks.  This analysis is motivated by the findings in Tables 4 and 5 that the 
availability of internal capital, in the form of cash, at the time of a shock is associated 
with the performance of small firms but not large.  Therefore, of particular interest are 
the differences in how small and large firms finance themselves around these events.  
We examine this issue by sorting firms by size and cash holdings and then examining 
the use of various forms of external financing in the year of the shock.  Results from 
this analysis are shown in Table 8. 
 
Industry Shocks 
In Panel A of Table 8 we examine changes around negative industry shocks 
and scale these changes by assets in the year prior to the shock.  The findings show a 
clear difference in the use of liabilities around shocks between large and small firms.  
The fraction of liabilities to assets increases by 1.46% for the median large and 
decreases by 2.15% for the median small firm.  In other words, large firms respond to 
negative industry shocks by borrowing more while small firms borrow less.   
Differences in the use of leverage become more apparent when we further sort 
the sample by cash holdings.  Consistent with firms borrowing to make up for a 
shortage of internal financing (cash), we find that large firms with less cash increase 
liabilities to assets by 2.02%.  Large firms with more cash only increase liabilities to 
assets by 0.41%.  There is no evidence, however, of low cash small firms borrowing 
more than high cash small firms around shocks.  In fact, low cash small firms reduce 
liabilities by more than high cash small firms (-2.56% versus -1.58%).  There is also 
no evidence that small firms with low cash holdings, or small firms in general, make 
up for this reduction in liabilities by increasing equity financing.   
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An examination of changes to the maturity structure of the liabilities shows a 
shift from long term liabilities to short term liabilities.22  The extent of this shift helps 
explain the differences in borrowing between large and small firms.  For example, 
among large firms, the ratio of short term liabilities to assets increases by 2.55% for 
low cash and by 1.19% for high cash.  Long term liabilities, however, decrease by 
1.72% for low cash and by 0.43% for high cash.  For small firms, long term liabilities 
decrease by 2.60% for low cash and by 0.04% for high cash.23  Although small firms 
increase their use of short term liabilities, they do so to a much lesser extent than large 
firms.  In addition, there is no significant difference in this increase between high cash 
and low cash small firms.  Therefore, the increase in liabilities for large firms, 
especially low cash large firms, and decrease for small firms is mostly due to 
differences in the use of short term liabilities. 
For both large and small firms there is an association between cash holdings 
and the use of trade credit around negative shocks.  We measure changes in trade 
credit (also referred to as supplier financing) as the net change in a firm’s accounts 
payables minus its accounts receivables.  We scale this net change by assets.  A 
positive change indicates that a firm is increasing its net use of trade credit (i.e., using 
more trade credit than it is granting) while a negative change indicates a decrease in 
the use of trade credit.  There is a slight decrease in the use of trade credit for large 
firms but not small.  What stands out, however, is the difference between high cash 
and low cash firms.  Small firms with low cash increase their use of trade credit by 
0.08% while small firms with high cash reduce their reliance on trade credit by 
                                                 
22 The change in short term liabilities shown here includes accounts payable.  Results are similar if we 
exclude accounts payable from the calculation of short term debt.  We also examine changes in 
accounts payable separately in this table.  
23 In additional untabulated analysis there is some evidence that one of the sources of the decrease in 
long term liabilities is a decrease in liabilities to financial institutions, although in general these 
changes seem to be spread across various sources of long term financing.   
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0.14%.  Similarly, large firms with low cash increase trade credit by 0.13% while 
large firms with high cash reduce trade credit by 0.36%.  As discussed in Peterson and 
Rajan (1997) and Petersen and Rajan (1994), trade credit is arguably the most 
important source of short term finance and among the most expensive forms of credit.  
To the extent that an increase in trade credit financing reflects firms stretching out 
their payables because they cannot obtain other forms of financing, a shortage of cash 
can be especially costly.  At the same time, if holding more cash enables firms to 
provide more trade credit, additional cash holdings can be beneficial, see for example 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2012). 
In the final row of Panel A, we examine the changes in cash holdings.  Of 
primary interest is the extent to which firms use internal capital to fund operations 
during shocks.  The findings show that for high cash firms, cash is an important 
source of financing.  Cash decreases by 2.45% for large high cash firms and by 3.31% 
for small high cash firms.  There is little evidence that low cash firms use cash to fund 
operations during shocks.  In fact, low cash firms slightly increase cash holdings.  
This increase in cash holdings is 0.03% for large low cash firms and 0.42% for small 
low cash firms.  The findings indicate that firms with greater cash holdings manage 
negative shocks using cash while low cash firms use external financing or cut back on 
operations.  The results can be compared to Daniel, Denis, and Naveen (2010) who 
examine how firms react to cash shortfalls.  They find that firms realizing cash 
shortfalls issue debt rather than using cash holdings.  Although we find similar results 
for the large low cash firms in our sample, there is also evidence that high cash firms 
– both large and small – reduce cash holdings around negative shocks.   
Overall, the findings in Panel A support the idea that large firms have a greater 
ability to access the external capital market when internal funding falls short.  It is 
27 
 
difficult to know whether to interpret the lack of borrowing by small firms, especially 
small low cash firms, as a supply or demand effect.  One explanation is that when 
negative shocks occur, small firms have very limited access to credit, other than trade 
credit.  This supply of credit explanation is consistent with survey evidence indicating 
that the constraints around a shock vary with firm size.  For example, in the March 
2009 Duke / CFO Magazine survey, only 27% of firms with less than $25 million 
reported that they had the ability to obtain external funding to finance attractive 
investment projects compared to roughly 54% of the firms with more than $25 million 
in sales.24  An alternative is a demand for credit explanation.  Owners, who are likely 
often poorly diversified, are not willing to take on additional credit around these 
events (other than stretching out payables) because their concerns have shifted from 
growth to survival.25  In either case, the availability of internal financing can be 
especially valuable.  
 
Macroeconomic Shocks 
In Panel B of Table 8 we focus on changes in financing around Global 
Financial Crisis.  Although the results for small firms are similar to the results using 
industry shocks, results differ substantially for large firms.  The biggest difference 
between this macroeconomic shock and industry shocks is in the use of leverage.  For 
the median large firm, the fraction of liabilities to assets decreases by 2.55%.  
Moreover, the 2.95% reduction in liabilities for large low cash firms exceeds the 
1.80% reduction for the large high cash firms.  Therefore, unlike the results for the 
                                                 
24 See question 12b of the March 2009 US survey http://www.cfosurvey.org.  In another question of 
this survey (12a), companies are asked about financing during normal market conditions.  Sixty-six 
percent of the firms with less than $25 million reported the ability to obtain external funding to finance 
investment projects compared to eighty-five percent of firms with more than $25 million.   
25 For a discussion of the concerns of small businesses following the most recent financial crisis and 
recession see “Small Firms Hunger for Sales, Not Credit,” The Wall Street Journal, August 5 2011.  
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industry shocks, large firms with low amounts of cash are not making up for cash 
shortfalls by borrowing more.  There is also no evidence that the large firms with low 
cash holdings increase their equity, increase their use of supplier financing, or use 
their existing cash holdings to fund operations.26  These results are consistent with 
evidence in Table 6 that the differences in operating performance between high cash 
large firms and low cash large firms are greater around macroeconomic shocks than 
industry shocks.  The findings suggest that the type of shock can be important for the 
value of cash holdings.  In particular, for larger firms, cash holdings can be more 
valuable around shocks that also affect the availability of external financing.   
Overall, the results show the benefits from cash holdings when a firm realizes 
a negative shock and is not able to – or not willing to – use external financing to offset 
the shock.  These finding are consistent with the argument in Harford et al (2013) that 
the risks of refinancing can explain why firms with more short term debt hold more 
cash.   
 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES 
Measuring performance using a firm’s survival 
We consider alternative measures of firms’ performance around a shock.  
First, we examine whether a firm survives a negative shock.  A benefit of focusing on 
a firm’s survival is that survival is probably the performance measure that its owners 
care about most.   
                                                 
26 By comparison, Hunter (1982) examines all corporations during the Great Depression of the 1930’s 
and documents that there were substantial differences in changes in cash holdings between large and 
small firms in the United States.  In particular, very large firms (corporations in the top 1% of total 
assets) increased holdings of liquid assets, while smaller firms decreased holdings.  Hunter attributes 
this reduction in cash for small firms to a reduction in the supply of bank credit caused by changes in 
monetary policy around the Great Depression. 
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To conduct this analysis we classify firms that remain in the sample from the 
beginning of a year to the beginning of the next year as a survivor for the year.  Non-
survivors are the firms that leave the sample during the year.  We then estimate 
logistical regressions in which the dependent variable is set to 0 if the firm survives 
and 1 if not.  Regressions are estimated for the year of the shock (year t) and each 
year around the shock (i.e., year t-1 and year t+1).  Otherwise, the regression 
specifications are identical to the regressions in Table 4.  Results are in Table 9.  
Panel A includes all firms that exit the sample.  Panel B excludes firms that exit 
because of a merger, which might actually be a positive outcome for owners.  Of 
greatest interest for our analysis, is the coefficient on the cash holdings variable. 
In both panels, the coefficient on the cash holdings variable is significantly 
negative for small firms for years t and t+1 relative to a shock.  In other words, small 
firms with more cash are more likely to survive through the year of or the year after a 
shock.  To put these values in perspective, in untabulated analysis we compute the 
probability of survival around a shock for the firms with cash holdings in the top 
quartile (high cash) and the firms in lowest quartile (low cash).27  We find that the 
probability of surviving a negative shock is eighty-nine percent for small firms with 
high cash holdings compared to eighty-one percent for small firms with low cash 
holdings.  For large firms there is little difference in survival probability between high 
cash and low cash firms.   
The findings show that – like the results for change in sales – the benefits of 
cash holdings for a firm’s survivorship are most apparent for small firms when a 
negative shock occurs.  For a larger firm, holding more cash does not appear to 
improve its ability to survive a shock. 
                                                 
27 These probabilities are the average marginal effects estimated using Stata’s Margins command.  
Findings are similar when we estimate marginal effects with other variables set at average values. 
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Measuring performance using change in market share 
As an additional measure of performance around shocks we take an approach 
similar to Fresard (2010) and examine changes in market share.  We define a firm’s 
market share as its sales divided by total sales for all firms in its industry.  We 
compute this measure in years before and after the shock.  The change in market share 
is the difference in this measure between years (market share post-shock minus 
market share pre-shock).  The pre-shock is year (t-1).  The post-shock is measured 
through end of the shock year (t), end of the year after the shock (t+1), and through 
end of two years after the shock (t+2).  The magnitude of the change in market share 
is generally very small.  For example, the median percentage point change in market 
share is 0.002 for small firms and 0.013 for large firms (untabulated).  To better 
understand the importance of cash for the change in market share, we estimate 
regressions.  The regressions are similar to the regressions in Table 9 except the 
dependent variable is the change in a firm’s market share around a shock, rather than 
a variable indicating whether a firm survived a shock.   
The results shown in Table 10 provide some evidence that small firms with 
higher cash holdings realize larger increases in market share around negative shocks 
than firms with less cash.  In the regressions estimated on small firms, the coefficient 
on the cash holdings variable is positive, although only statistically significant (at the 
10% level) through the end of the shock year.  For regressions estimated using the 
sample of larger firms, the coefficient on cash holdings is negative and statistically 
significant through both year one and year two after the shock.  Therefore, there is no 
evidence that additional cash holdings enable larger firms to gain market share during 
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negative shocks.  Overall, the results from this analysis indicate that findings are 
similar regardless of how performance is measured. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Our analysis shows the importance of cash policy decisions for small private 
firms.  In particular, among firms with relatively few assets, those holding more cash 
realize greater improvements in sales around negative industry shocks.  Small firms 
with more cash also make smaller reductions in investment and assets and are more 
likely to survive negative shocks than small firms with less cash.  Results are similar 
when we investigate negative macroeconomic shocks.  There is little evidence that 
small firms with more cash perform better during other conditions.  The findings 
indicate that the value of cash for small firms is largely from precautionary benefits. 
For large private firms, the benefits of holding more cash are less clear.  There 
is no evidence that a large firm’s cash holdings are associated with changes in its sales 
around a negative shock or with the probability of it surviving a negative shock.  At 
least in part, these results are because large firms adjust to negative shocks by 
increasing their use of credit financing.  Consistent with this explanation, we find that 
the benefits of cash holdings that do exist for large firms are greatest around 
macroeconomic shocks that can reduce the availability of credit.    
One area that cash seems to matter for both large and small firms is for the use 
of trade credit around negative shocks.  We find that cash holdings are negatively 
associated with changes in a private firm’s dependence on supplier financing around a 
negative shock, regardless of the firm’s size or the type of shock.  The results 
highlight the role of cash in helping improve a firm’s standing in the trade credit 
market. 
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In summary, the benefits of cash holdings for private businesses are often not 
apparent.  Therefore, among the many decisions made by owners of small private 
businesses, the choice of a cash policy might easily be overlooked.  Nonetheless, 
when a negative shock occurs, cash holdings can be decisive for both a firm’s 
operating performance and its probability of survival.  
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Appendix   
Sample Construction 
This table shows the construction of the initial sample for our analysis.  The full sample is all firms in the Centre for Corporate  
Governance Research (CCGR) database.  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Full sample 145656 149468 153912 155996 158259 182689 208971 222196 233955 238213 
Drop if variable is the tails of distribution * 22614 28507 31734 31309 31426 30373  33001 35206 39752  41601  
Drop if the largest owner is state 957  1048  1059  1081  1075  1067  1066  1094  1090  1071  
Drop financial firms & missing-indutry-code firms  4346  5135  4923  3723  4168  9926  22797 23301 25671  15513  
Drop extreme unbalanced obs.** 420  450  380  1260  759  5593  298  253  370  263  
Drop if number of employees < 3 37065 36385 37069 38243 37995 40571  41064 41833 40898  38694  
Drop if zero sales 28035 26772 27222 27527 29202 34286  44698 50514 53053  68008  
Sample after all filters 52219 51171 51525 52853 53634 60873  66047 69995 73121  73063  
Drop if listed on Oslo Børs or Oslo Axess 19 17 18 18 20 15 21 15 13 14 
Sample after dropping listed firms 52200 51154 51507 52835 53614 60858 66026 69980 73108 73049 
Drop non-limited liability firms 1504 1387 2065 2187 2248 3713 4316 4804 6212 6232 
Sample after dropping non-limited liability firms 50696 49767 49442 50648 51366 57145 61710 65176 66896 66817 
* Tails are top and bottom 1%.  Done to minimize the effect of extreme observations that likely contain errors.  
** Balance sheet is classified as unbalanced if the absolute value of the difference between assets and liabilities plus shareholder equity exceeds 2000NOK.  
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Appendix. Continued 
Definition of Variables  
This table shows the construction of the main variables.  The cash holdings variable is defined as cash and other liquid securities, similar to 
Acharya et al. (2007).  The other variables are constructed by the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR).  Definitions of control 
variables are provided in the tables.   
 
Cash holding = Investments in listed companies + Investments in listed bonds + Investment in other traded financial instruments + 
Other financial instruments + Cash and cash equivalents + Other current assets 
  
Investment = Change in R&D + change of Total fixed assets (tangible) - Depreciation – Impairment and write-down of fixed assets 
and intangible assets 
  
Sales = Revenue (other operating revenue is not included) 
  
Short term liabilities = Convertible loans + Certificate loans w/ less than 1 yr maturity + Liabilities to financial institutions + Accounts 
payable + Tax payable + Public duties payable + Dividends + Debts to companies in same group + Bank overdraft + 
Other short term liabilities  
  
Long term liabilities = Pension liabilities + Deferred tax + Other provisions + Provisions + Convertible Bonds + Bonds + Liabilities to 
financial institutions + Subordinated loan capital + Long term liabilities groups + Other long-term liabilities  
  
Total liabilities =  Short term liabilities + Long term liabilities 
  
Net income = Income after tax and after extraordinary revenue and expenses 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics (mean, median, standard deviation) of sample firms (all private firms 
from Norway that pass our filters). Firms are sorted on size (assets) into quartiles with 1=smallest and 
4=largest quartile. Firm characteristics are grouped into the following categories: firm size; growth, profits, 
investment & age; financing; owners and others. The sample ranges from 2000 to 2009; variables based on 
changes include data from 1999. Values are in NOK. 
 
 Size 
 1=smallest 2 3 4=largest 
SIZE     
Sales 
1663133 4572940 9471331 30966813 
1346543 3749783 7718085 21431703 
1884397 4162286 8348098 30355152 
Assets 
538856 1696327 4100586 24601072 
541042 1654734 3895784 13623124 
278764 435611 1133242 32968575 
# of Employees 
5.272 6.753 9.888 24.874 
4 5 8 16 
4.894 6.829 9.662 38.093 
GROWTH, PROFITS, 
INVESTMENT & AGE     
Sales Growth 
0.230 0.193 0.179 0.189 
-0.001 0.026 0.036 0.042 
1.174 0.897 0.831 0.853 
Asset Growth 
0.091 0.136 0.165 0.195 
-0.055 0.011 0.034 0.046 
0.853 0.691 0.674 0.720 
Return on Assets 
-0.009 0.074 0.088 0.081 
0.029 0.072 0.078 0.066 
0.331 0.205 0.172 0.156 
Investment 
4965 50145 153381 1053719 
0 0 26191 158321 
192913 392001 835966 9567398 
Firm Age (in years) 
7.627 9.763 11.431 14.504 
5 7 9 11 
9.107 9.809 10.578 13.872 
FINANCING     
Cash Holding 
0.329 0.259 0.226 0.175 
0.258 0.194 0.159 0.096 
0.281 0.234 0.218 0.200 
Total Liabilities / 
Assets 
0.869 0.810 0.775 0.728 
0.784 0.825 0.816 0.776 
0.613 0.293 0.228 0.216 
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Table 1. Continued     
ST Debt / Total Debt 
0.832 0.759 0.712 0.654 
1 0.879 0.813 0.732 
0.266 0.285 0.304 0.322 
Dividends / Net 
Income 
0.141 0.268 0.302 0.264 
0 0 0 0 
0.420 0.539 0.554 0.527 
Rating 
0.401 0.470 0.537 0.632 
0.44 0.5 0.57 0.66 
0.175 0.176 0.171 0.169 
OWNERS     
CEO Share 
52.611 48.873 41.811 24.777 
50 50 37 0 
37.170 37.589 37.937 34.099 
Largest Owner's 
Share 
68.168 67.370 65.563 62.053 
60 60 60 52 
27.686 27.502 27.990 29.358 
Family Firm 
(dummy) 
0.599 0.646 0.616 0.484 
1 1 1 0 
0.490 0.478 0.486 0.500 
Institutional Share 
0.336 0.739 1.240 1.892 
0 0 0 0 
5.008 7.621 9.949 11.720 
State Share 
0.213 0.273 0.402 1.166 
0 0 0 0 
3.390 4.015 4.822 8.242 
CEO in Largest 
Family 
0.648 0.685 0.643 0.4720 
1 1 1 0 
0.478 0.465 0.479 0.499 
OTHER     
Number of 
observations 136287 145664 145955 141757 
Number of Unique 
Firms 52041 50568 45138 36223 
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Table 2: Negative and Positive Industry Sales Growth Shocks 
This table reports descriptive statistics (year, mean sales growth, and the number of firms: N) of 
industry sales growth shocks. Industry sales growth shocks are defined by the following cut-off 
levels: -7.2 percent (bottom 11 percent) for negative shocks and 24.9 percent (top 11 percent) for 
positive shocks over 2000 - 2008; changes in 2000 include data from 1999. 
 
NEGATIVE INDUSTRY SHOCK 
INDUSTRY Year Industry Sales Growth N 
multisector 2007 -64.02% 659 
energy 2000 -12.03% 143 
energy 2004 -9.58% 251 
multisector 2000 -9.32% 945 
agriculture 2003 -8.79% 1374
energy 2005 -8.17% 257 
agriculture 2001 -7.65% 1339
agriculture 2002 -7.22% 1320
POSITIVE INDUSTRY SHOCK 
INDUSTRY Year Industry Sales Growth N 
energy 2002 24.93% 180 
multisector 2004 26.16% 1991
energy 2006 26.98% 305 
construction 2007 27.75% 8508
transport 2005 31.15% 3029
agriculture 2005 35.87% 1676
multisector 2003 37.36% 1587
multisector 2006 58.14% 3728
 
 
41 
 
Table 3:  Industry Sales Growth Shocks 
The table shows coefficient estimates of industry sales growth shock dummy variable from panel 
regression specifications similar to Table 4 in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994).  Firms are sorted by 
assets.  Size 1 and 2 have fewer assets than the sample median.  Size 3 and 4 have greater assets 
than the sample median.  Regressions contain the following variables with untabulated 
coefficients: one period lag of the shock (industry sales growth dummy variables), lagged 
dependent variables, GDP, Inflation, Short Term Rate, Industry and Year dummy variables plus 
a constant. Regressions are estimated separately for negative and positive industry sales growth 
shocks.  The main sample includes all firms in an industry realizing a shock between 2000 to 
2008, as defined in Table 2.  Changes and lagged variables include data prior to 2000.  Error 
terms are corrected for clustering at the firm level.  T-statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Dep. Var. Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 
 NEGATIVE INDUSTRY SHOCK 
Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1) -0.110** -0.080*** 
 (-2.54) (-4.56)    
Δ INVENTORY / ASSETS (t-1) -0.008* -0.004 
 (-1.82) (-1.29) 
Δ STD / ASSETS (t-1) -0.030** -0.021*** 
 (-2.05) (-2.68)    
 POSITIVE INDUSTRY SHOCK 
Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1) 0.169*** 0.124*** 
 (5.51) (8.37)    
Δ INVENTORY / ASSETS (t-1) 0.001 0.002 
 (0.35) (0.72) 
Δ STD / ASSETS (t-1) 0.015* 0.019*** 
 (1.72) (3.72)    
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Table 4a: Cash Holdings and Changes in Sales 
This table reports coefficient estimates of Cash Holding for OLS regressions.  The dependent 
variable is the change in sales to assets during the year of an industry shock.  Control variables 
with untabulated coefficients include Mean Sales Growth (computed from sales growth rates 
over t-1 and t-2; where t denotes the shock year), HHN (HHN is the Acharya, Almeida, and 
Campello (2007) measure of high hedging needs), lagged dependent variable, Industry Sales 
Growth (t, t-1, t-2, t-3), ∆ Number of Employees / Assets (t-1), Return on Assets (t-1), Account 
Payable Turnover (t-1), Account Payable (t-1) / Assets (t-1), Account Receivable (t-1) / Assets 
(t-1), the logarithm of Firm Age, Bank Overdraft (t-1) / Total Liabilities (t-1), Dividends (t-1) / 
Net Income (t-1), Rating, PP&E (t-1) + Inventory (t-1) / Assets (t-1), Total Liabilities (t-1) / 
PP&E (t-1) + Inventory (t-1), MRDOL (Mandelker and Rhee (1984) measure of operating 
leverage), Percentage change of liabilities, Percentage change of equity, CEO Share, Ownership 
Herfindahl, Institutional Share, State Share, Largest Owner's Share, Second Largest Owner's 
Share, and Family Firm, CEO member of Largest Family, Industry and Year dummy variables 
plus a constant. The main sample includes all firms in an industry realizing a shock between 
2000 to 2008, as defined in Table 2.  Changes and lagged variables include data prior to 2000.  
Shocks (industry sales growth shocks) are defined in Table 2.  Error terms are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level.  T-statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 NEGATIVE INDUSTRY 
SHOCK 
POSITIVE INDUSTRY 
SHOCK 
Dep. Var. / In-Dep. Var. Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1) Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-
1) 
Cash Holding (t-1) / Assets (t-1) 0.0715 -0.089 
 
 
Also includes industry dummies, year dummies, 
and other control variables 
(0.73) 
 
 
(-0.82) 
 
 
N 2394 10711 
adj. R2 0.139 0.106 
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Table 4b: Cash Holdings, Changes in Sales, and Firm Size with Industry Shocks 
This table reports coefficient estimates for OLS regressions with change in sales to assets during the year of an industry shock as the 
dependent variable.  Firms are sorted by assets.  Size 1 and 2 have fewer assets than the sample median.  Size 3 and 4 have greater 
assets than the sample median.  The other control variables are described in Table 4a. Shocks (industry sales growth shocks) are 
defined in Table 2. The main sample includes all firms in an industry realizing a shock between 2000 to 2008, as defined in Table 2.  
Changes and lagged variables include data prior to 2000.  The no shock sample corresponds to the pooled data after filters and 
excludes the observations in the negative and positive industry shock samples.  Error terms are corrected for clustering at the firm 
level.  T-statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 NEGATIVE INDUSTRY SHOCK
POSITIVE INDUSTRY 
SHOCK NO SHOCK (POOLED) 
 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 
Dep. Var. / In-Dep. Var. Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1) 
CASH HOLDING (t-1) / ASSETS (t-1) 0.331** -0.082 -0.163 -0.021 -0.043 0.027 
 (1.97)  (-0.69) (-0.77) (-0.17) (-1.34) (1.19) 
MEAN SALES GROWTH 0.004 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 0.000** 
 (0.27) (-0.24) (-0.37) (-3.59) (-0.79) (2.51) 
HHN 0.106* -0.049 0.168** 0.141*** 0.052*** 0.100*** 
 (1.77) (-1.03) (2.27) (3.11) (5.14) (9.65) 
       
Also includes industry dummies, year 
dummies, and other control variables 
N 1037 1357 4291 6420 94342 123303 
adj. R2 0.142 0.194 0.055 0.222 0.074 0.112 
Including macro variables (changes in GDP, inflation, and over-night lending rates) lead to identical coefficient estimates as long as year dummy variables are included in 
the regressions.  HHN is estimated using data: t, t-1, t-2. Using HHN based on data t-1, t t+1 or t, t+1, t+2 (consistent with Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 
(2007)) yield qualitatively similar results.  Sorts on size are performed only for firms that experience a (positive / negative) shock. Global sorts based on all firms 
that pass our filters yield qualitatively similar regressions results.   
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Table 4c: Average of Lagged Cash Holdings, Firm Performance and Firm Size with Industry Shocks 
This table reports coefficient estimates for OLS regressions with change in sales to assets during the year of an industry shock as the 
dependent variable.  Firms are sorted by assets.  Size 1 and 2 have fewer assets than the sample median.  Size 3 and 4 have greater 
assets than the sample median.  Avg Cash Holding / Assets is the average ratio of Cash to Assets from year t-3 to year t-1 prior to the 
shock.  The other control variables are described in Table 4a.  Shocks (industry sales growth shocks) are defined in Table 2. The main 
sample includes all firms in an industry realizing a shock between 2000 to 2008, as defined in Table 2.  Changes and lagged variables 
include data prior to 2000.  The no shock sample corresponds to the pooled data after filters and excludes the observations in the 
negative and positive industry shock samples.  Error terms are corrected for clustering at the firm level.  T-statistics are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 NEGATIVE INDUSTRY SHOCK
POSITIVE INDUSTRY 
SHOCK NO SHOCK (POOLED) 
 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 
Dep. Var. / In-Dep. Var. Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1)
Δ SALES / 
ASSETS (t-1) 
AVG. CASH HOLDING / ASSETS  0.320** 0.002 0.087 0.139 0.050* 0.096*** 
 (2.10)  (0.02) (0.61) (1.26) (1.67) (4.59) 
MEAN SALES GROWTH 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.000 0.000** 
 (0.18) (-0.24) (-0.41) (-3.63) (-1.12) (2.52) 
HHN 0.106* -0.048 0.175** 0.144*** 0.053*** 0.101*** 
 (1.76) (-1.00) (2.44) (3.17) (5.26) (9.74) 
Also includes industry dummies, year 
dummies, and other control variables 
N 1037 1357 4290 6420 94318 123287 
adj. R2 0.141 0.193 0.055 0.223 0.074 0.112 
Including macro variables (changes in GDP, inflation, and over-night lending rates) lead to identical coefficient estimates as long as year dummy variables are included in 
the regressions.  HHN is estimated using data: t, t-1, t-2. Using HHN based on data t-1, t t+1 or t, t+1, t+2 (consistent with Acharya, Almeida, and Campello 
(2007)) yield qualitatively similar results.  Sorts on size are performed only for firms that experience a (positive / negative) shock. Global sorts based on all firms 
that pass our filters yield qualitatively similar regressions results.   
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Table 4d: Cash Holdings, Changes in Sales, and Firm Size with Industry Shocks 
Difference – in – Difference –in - Difference Specification 
This table reports coefficient estimates for OLS regressions.  The dependent variable is the 
change in sales to assets during the year of a negative industry shock.  Negative Shock is set to 
one during negative industry shocks that are defined in Table 2 and zero years when a negative 
shock does not occur.  Small Firm is set to one for firms with assets less than the sample median 
and zero for firms with assets greater than the median.  High Cash is set to one for firms with a 
ratio of cash to assets in the top quartile of the sample and zero otherwise.  The other control 
variables are described in Table 4a.  Error terms are corrected for clustering at the firm level.  T-
statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1) 
MEAN SALES GROWTH -0.001    
(-1.11)    
HHN 0.139*** 
(3.85)    
Negative Shock -0.074    
(-0.30)    
Small Firm -0.045    
(-1.18)    
High Cash -0.008    
(-0.25)    
Negative Shock * Small Firm 0.078*   
(1.83)    
Negative Shock * High Cash -0.109**  
(-2.19)    
Small Firm * High Cash -0.017    
(-0.37)    
Negative Shock * Small Firm * High Cash 0.152**  
(2.08)    
Also includes industry dummies, year dummies, and 
other control variables 
N 13105    
adj. R-sq 0.109    
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Table 5a: Cash Holdings, Changes in Sales, and Firm Size with Macro Shock 
This table reports coefficient estimates for OLS regressions.  The dependent variable with 
change in sales to assets during the negative shock to GDP growth in 2009 as the dependent 
variable.  Firms are sorted by assets.  Size 1 and 2 have fewer assets than the sample median.  
The other control variables are described in Table 4a. Error terms are corrected for clustering at 
the firm level.  T-statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 NEGATIVE MACRO SHOCK 
 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 
Dep. Var. / In-Dep. Var. Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1) Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1)
CASH HOLDING (t-1) / ASSETS (t-1) 0.203** 0.015 
 (2.05) (0.42) 
Mean Sales Growth 0.008 0.000 
 (0.95) (0.52) 
HHN -0.007 0.032 
 (-0.23) (0.97) 
N 11986 16586 
adj. R2 0.066 0.065 
In the regressions HHN are backward looking using data: t, t-1, t-2. 
Global sorts based on all firms that pass our filters yield qualitatively similar results. 
Including macro variables (Δ GDP, Inflation and Average Over-Night Lending Rates) lead to identical coefficient 
estimates as long as year dummy variables are included in the regressions. 
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Table 5b: Average of Lagged Cash Holdings, Changes in Sales, and Firm Size with Macro 
Shock 
This table reports coefficient estimates for OLS regressions.  The dependent variable with 
change in sales to assets during the negative shock to GDP growth in 2009 as the dependent 
variable.  Firms are sorted by assets.  Size 1 and 2 have fewer assets than the sample median. 
Avg Cash Holding / Assets is the average ratio of Cash to Assets from year t-3 to year t-1 prior 
to the shock.   The other control variables are described in Table 4a. Error terms are corrected for 
clustering at the firm level.  T-statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 NEGATIVE MACRO SHOCK 
 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 
Dep. Var. / In-Dep. Var. Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1) Δ SALES / ASSETS (t-1)
AVG. CASH HOLDING  / ASSETS      0.368***     0.241*** 
 (4.15) (6.66)    
Mean Sales Growth 0.009 0.000    
 (0.98) (0.12)    
HHN 0.001 0.040    
 (0.04) (1.19)    
N 11986 16586 
adj. R2 0.067 0.067 
In the regressions HHN are backward looking using data: t, t-1, t-2. 
Global sorts based on all firms that pass our filters yield qualitatively similar results. 
Including macro variables (Δ GDP, Inflation and Average Over-Night Lending Rates) lead to identical coefficient 
estimates as long as year dummy variables are included in the regressions. 
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Table 6: Changes around Shocks 
This table reports median percentage change in operational and financial activities during the year of a shock.  The main sample for 
the negative industry shocks is from 2000 to 2008 and defined in Table 2.  The Macroeconomic shock sample: 2009; changes and 
lagged variables include data prior to 2009.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 non-parametric 
test (wilcoxon/ rank sums) whether medians are zero. 
 
  SMALL
 
LARGE
p-
value
SMALL-
LOW 
SMALL-
HIGH
p-
value 
LARGE-
LOW
LARGE-
HIGH
p-
value 
PANEL A NEGATIVE INDUSTRY SHOCK
Δ INVENTORY  / INVENTORY (t-1) -2.39*** 3.57*** 0.00 -2.89*** -2.38*** 0.13 2.50*** 5.10*** 0.15 
Δ EMPLOYEES  / EMPLOYEES (t-1) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.11 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.72 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.91 
Δ INVESTMENT  / INVESTMENT (t-1) -79.53*** -66.99*** 0.00 -82.76*** -74.85*** 0.06 -72.60*** -57.10*** 0.01 
Δ ASSETS  / ASSETS (t-1) -3.94*** 1.34*** 0.00 -4.96*** -2.50*** 0.00 1.23*** 1.58*** 0.82 
          
N 2992 2996  1192 1477  1615 1254  
PANEL B NEGATIVE MACRO SHOCK
Δ INVENTORY  / INVENTORY (t-1) -2.07*** -2.07*** 0.05 -4.57*** -2.07*** 0.00 -3.93*** -0.79*** 0.00 
Δ EMPLOYEES  / EMPLOYEES (t-1) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 
Δ INVESTMENT  / INVESTMENT (t-1) -86.42*** -73.76*** 0.00 -84.28*** -88.36*** 0.00 -74.48*** -72.95*** 0.03 
Δ ASSETS  / ASSETS (t-1) -3.76*** -0.93*** 0.00 -5.12*** -2.07*** 0.00 -2.03*** 1.80*** 0.00 
          
N 32659 34158  13321 17773  19569 14154  
Sorts on size are performed only for firms that experience a (positive / negative) industry shock or 2009 macro shock. Global sorts based on all firms that pass 
our filters yield qualitatively similar results. 
 
49 
 
Table 7: Cash Savings  
Coefficient estimates for OLS regressions.  Csh holdings before negative industry sales shock is the dependent variable. The sources 
of cash savings, i.e., the explanatory variables, include Operating Cash Flows / Assets, (Operating Cash Flows - Dividends) / 
Operating Cash Flows, Δ Liabilities / Assets, Δ Equity / Assets with the following timing: t-1, t-2 and t-3 (in Panel A) or means 
thereof (in Panel B).  Δ Equity is defined as changes in paid-in capital and excludes retained earnings.  The regressions also include 
the cash savings at t-4 and a constant as well as untabulated Industry and Year dummy variables. Operating Cash Flows - Dividends is 
set to zero if operating cash flows are negative or if dividends exceed operating cash flows. Main sample: 2000 to 2008; changes and 
lagged variables include data prior to 2000. Shocks (industry sales growth shocks) are defined in Table 2.  Error terms are corrected 
for clustering at the firm level.  T-statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 SMALL LARGE SMALL-HIGH SMALL-LOW LARGE-HIGH LARGE-LOW 
Dep. Var. / In-Dep. Var. CASH (t-1) / ASSETS (t-1) 
CASH (t-1) / 
ASSETS (t-1) 
CASH (t-1) / 
ASSETS (t-1) 
CASH (t-1) / 
ASSETS (t-1) 
CASH (t-1) / 
ASSETS (t-1) 
CASH (t-1) / 
ASSETS (t-1) 
 PANEL A 
OPCF (t-1) / ASSETS (t-1) 0.083* 0.136*** 0.052 0.010*** 0.122*** 0.000   
 (1.79) (8.43) (1.27) (2.82) (7.04) (0.01)   
OPCF–DIV (t-1) / OPCF (t-1) -0.005 0.004 0.018 -0.001 0.006 0.004** 
 (-0.28) (0.49) (1.08) (-0.56) (0.57) (2.49)   
Δ LIABILITIES (t-1) / ASSETS 
(t-2) -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.003*** 0.000**  
 (-1.11) (-0.49) (-0.01) (0.28) (-3.05) (2.03)    
Δ EQUITY (t-1) / ASSETS (t-2) 0.009 0.005 0.086 -0.008 0.074*** 0.001 
 (0.22) (0.29) (1.23) (-1.31) (4.01) (0.83) 
OPCF (t-2) / ASSETS (t-2) 0.014 0.105*** 0.025* -0.001*** 0.083*** 0.001 
 (1.40) (6.45) (1.91) (-2.95) (3.27) (0.42) 
OPCF–DIV (t-2) / OPCF (t-2) 0.026*** 0.009 0.022 0.003 0.020* 0.001 
 (2.65) (1.18) (1.52) (1.40) (1.69) (0.81) 
Δ LIABILITIES (t-2) / ASSETS 
(t-3) -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 (-0.45) (-4.24) (-0.49) (-5.09) (-11.57) (-4.50)  
Δ EQUITY (t-2) / ASSETS (t-3) -0.032 -0.000 0.010 0.001 -0.024** 0.000**  
 (-1.18) (-0.36) (0.17) (0.52) (-2.10) (2.32)    
OPCF (t-3) / ASSETS (t-3) 0.003 0.012** -0.002 -0.000 0.0325 0.001*   
 (1.01) (2.00) (-0.12) (-0.19) (1.42) (1.94)    
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Table 7. Continued       
OPCF–DIV (t-3) / OPCF (t-3) 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.033** 0.002 0.032*** 0.000    
 (3.23) (5.46) (2.34) (0.79) (2.79) (0.33)    
Δ LIABILITIES (t-3) / ASSETS 
(t-4) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
 (-2.67) (-4.04) (-4.06) (-0.19) (-5.17) (0.59)    
Δ EQUITY (t-3) / ASSETS (t-4) -0.008 -0.000 -0.004 -0.006** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-0.46) (-0.26) (-0.19) (-2.38) (-0.89) (-5.05)    
CASH (t-4) / ASSETS (t-4) 0.534*** 0.425*** 0.445*** 0.041*** 0.421*** 0.018*** 
 (16.87) (13.87) (13.14) (5.28) (12.06) (3.72)    
CONSTANT 0.029** 0.049*** 0.128*** 0.020*** 0.196*** 0.025*** 
 (2.11) (5.48) (6.27) (8.32) (4.66) (3.84)    
N 1691 2278 911 780 1041 1237 
adj. R2 0.373 0.357 0.303 0.090 0.331 0.094 
 PANEL B 
MEAN OPCF / ASSETS 0.011 0.108** 0.058** 0.000 0.250*** 0.000   
 (1.20) (2.12) (2.10) (0.74) (5.67) (0.22)    
MEAN OPCF–DIV / OPCF 0.073*** 0.084*** 0.067*** 0.005* 0.055*** 0.006*** 
 (4.10) (4.58) (2.71) (1.69) (2.63) (2.71)    
MEAN Δ LIABILITIES / 
ASSETS -0.001** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.001* -0.001*** 0.000   
 (-2.33) (-1.35) (-3.26) (-1.86) (-4.03) (0.81)    
MEAN Δ EQUITY / ASSETS -0.043 -0.001* 0.023 -0.011* -0.001 -0.000*** 
 (-0.79) (-1.74) (0.32) (-1.93) (-1.06) (-7.10)    
CASH (t-4) / ASSETS (t-4) 0.533*** 0.418*** 0.439*** 0.041*** 0.392*** 0.018*** 
 (16.59) (13.77) (12.78) (5.29) (11.14) (3.98)    
CONSTANT 0.020 0.034*** 0.135*** 0.018*** 0.189*** 0.023***
 (1.57) (3.23) (6.65) (7.97) (4.32) (3.56)    
N 1691 2278 911 780 1041 1237   
adj. R2 0.348 0.305 0.295 0.084 0.301 0.094    
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8: Source of Financing around Shocks 
This table reports median percentage change for sources of ex-post financing, i.e., financing over a shock year. Main sample for 
negative industry shocks: 2000 to 2008; changes and lagged variables include data prior to 2000. Shocks (industry sales growth 
shocks) are defined in Table 2. The macroeconomic shock sample is all firms in 2009; changes and lagged variables include data prior 
to 2009.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 come from non-parametric tests (wilcoxon / rank sums) whether medians are zero. 
 
  SMALL 
 
LARGE 
 
p-value 
SMALL-
LOW 
SMALL-
HIGH 
 
p-value 
LARGE-
LOW 
LARGE-
HIGH 
 
p-value 
PANEL A NEGATIVE INDUSTRY SHOCK
Δ LIABILITIES / ASSETS (t-1)  -2.15*** 1.46*** 0.00 -2.56*** -1.58*** 0.10 2.02*** 0.41*** 0.00 
Δ LONG-TERM LIAB. / ASSETS (t-1) -0.61*** -1.05*** 0.00 -2.60*** -0.04*** 0.00 -1.72*** -0.43*** 0.11 
Δ SHORT-TERM LIAB. / ASSETS (t-1) 0.62*** 1.93*** 0.00 0.72*** 0.52*** 0.59 2.55*** 1.19*** 0.00 
Δ EQUITY / ASSETS (t-1) -0.17*** -0.07*** 0.00 -0.16*** -0.17*** 0.24 -0.07*** -0.06*** 0.03 
Δ (AP-AR) / ASSETS (t-1) 0.00*** -0.03*** 0.05 0.08*** -0.14*** 0.00 0.13*** -0.36*** 0.00 
Δ CASH HOLDING / ASSETS  (t-1)    0.00*** 0.00*** 0.98     0.42*** -3.31*** 0.00     0.03***   -2.45*** 0.00 
          
N 2992 2996  1192 1477  1615 1254  
PANEL B NEGATIVE MACRO SHOCK
Δ LIABILITIES / ASSETS (t-1)  -3.23*** -2.55*** 0.00 -3.85*** -2.74*** 0.00 -2.95*** -1.80*** 0.00 
Δ LONG-TERM LIAB. / ASSETS (t-1) 0.00*** -0.14*** 0.08 -0.19*** 0.00*** 0.00 -1.21*** 0.00*** 0.00 
Δ SHORT-TERM LIAB. / ASSETS (t-1) -0.85*** -0.63*** 0.01 -0.43*** -1.30*** 0.02 -0.53*** -0.84*** 0.56 
Δ EQUITY /  ASSETS (t-1) -0.24*** -0.08*** 0.00 -0.24*** -0.24*** 0.01 -0.09*** -0.07*** 0.05 
Δ (AP-AR)  / ASSETS (t-1) 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.00** 0.00 0.00***     0.00 0.00 
Δ CASH HOLDING  / ASSETS  (t-1) -0.00*** 0.15*** 0.00 0.55*** -3.32*** 0.00 0.26*** -0.97*** 0.00 
          
N 32659 34158  13321 17773  19569 14154  
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Table 9: Cash Holdings and Firm Exit with Negative Industry Shocks 
This table reports coefficient estimates of Cash Holding from logistical regressions with exit (1) or survival (0) as the dependent 
variable for firms in negative shock industries.  Panel A includes all firms.  Panel B excludes firms that left the sample because of a 
merger.  Firms are sorted by assets.  Size 1 and 2 have fewer assets than the sample median.  Size 3 and 4 have greater assets than the 
sample median.  The other control variables are described in Table 4a. The main sample includes all firms in an industry realizing a 
shock between 2000 to 2008, as defined in Table 2.  Changes and lagged variables include data prior to 2000.  Error terms are corrected 
for clustering at the firm level.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
 t-1 EXIT t EXIT t+1 EXIT 
 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 Size: 1& 2 Size: 3 & 4 
Panel A       
CASH HOLDING (t-1) / ASSETS (t-1) -1.085 -0.216 -1.945*** -0.187 -2.172** 0.351 
 (-1.39) (-0.39) (-2.96) (-0.40) (-2.75)  (0.68)    
Also includes industry dummies, year 
dummies, and other control variables       
N 809 1324 1120 2002 1018 1357  
Prob. χ2 0.032 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.062 0.055 0.049 0.119 0.058 
 
Panel B  
CASH HOLDING (t-1) / ASSETS (t-1) -1.051 0.474 -2.069*** 0.0768 -2.282*** 0.569 
 (-1.32) (0.63) (-3.09) (0.13) (-2.80) (0.87) 
Also includes industry dummies, year 
dummies, and other control variables       
N 765 1042 1056  1557 946 989
Prob. χ2 0.022 0.000 0.002 0.0000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.057 0.097 0.054 0.060 0.118 0.086 
HHN are backward looking using data: t, t-1, t-2. 
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Table 10: Cash Holdings and Changes in Market Share with Negative Industry Shocks 
This table reports coefficient estimates of Cash Holding from OLS regressions with change in market share as the dependent variable.  
The other control variables are described in Table 4a. The main sample includes all firms in an industry realizing a shock between 
2000 to 2008, as defined in Table 2.  Changes and lagged variables include data prior to 2000.  Error terms are corrected for clustering at 
the firm level.  T-statistics are in parentheses.  * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 from t-1 to t from t-1 to t+1 from t-1 to t+2 
 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 Size: 1 & 2 Size: 3 & 4 Size: 1& 2 Size: 3 & 4 
CASH HOLDING (t-1) / ASSETS(t-1)a 0.007* -0.099 0.008 -0.133* 0.010 -0.152*
 (1.67) (-1.10) (1.10) (-1.73) (1.10)  (-1.88)    
 
Also includes industry dummies, year 
dummies, and other control variables       
N 1037 1357 892 1128 810 1067  
Adj R2 0.235 0.263 0.116 0.281 0.145 0.113 
a The coefficient on the cash holding variable is multiplied by 100 because of the small magnitude of the change in market share variable. 
Including macro variables (Δ GDP, Inflation and Average Over-Night Lending Rates) lead to identical coefficient estimates as long as year dummy variables are 
included in the regressions. 
In the regressions HHN are backward looking using data: t, t-1, t-2. 
Sorts on size are performed only for firms that experience a (negative) shock. Global sorts based on all firms that pass our filters yield qualitatively similar 
regressions results.   
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